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The G-20 and the broader world community has committed to ambitious goals to 
close global infrastructure gaps, mitigate climate change, and advance the 2030 
Agenda for development. We call on G20 leaders to task development finance 
institutions (DFIs) such as the development banks in member countries and the Multi-
lateral Development Banks (MDBs) of which G-20 countries are members, to commit 
to scaling up resources by 25 percent, to calibrate new financing to international 
commitments to mitigate climate change and the 2030 agenda, and to work together 
as an inclusive system toward achieving those shared goals.
Challenge
The world community needs to annually mobilize trillions of dollars in order to close 
infrastructure gaps and meet these broader goals and commitments. The private 
sector and national governments are falling far short of leading the way to financing 
these goals. DFIs are uniquely poised to provide and mobilze capital but the effort to 
date has been under-capitalized, under-performing, and uncoordinated.
Unmet global infrastructure needs to 2030 are over $3 trillion annually if they are to 
be conducted in a manner that is low carbon and socially inclusive.1 What is more, 
the credit gap for micro, small and medium enterprises across the globe is upwards 
of $2 trillion.2   
The private sector and national governments are doing little to address these gaps 
in long-run financing. Private capital flows are immense in scale but have proven 
to be biased toward short-term gains -flowing in ‘surges’ and unstable ‘sudden 
stops’ to emerging market and developing countries- rather than long term needs 
in infrastructure and human capital formation.3 Private sector levels of investment in 
gross fixed capital formation have been small and on the decline for decades.  In 1980 
private sector investment as a percent of gross domestic product was over 20 percent, 
and has declined to roughly 18 percent (Appendix 1). New research by the International 
1  McKinsey Global Institute (2016). Bridging Global Infrastructure Gaps. McKinsey & Company; World 
Bank (2017). Global Infrastructure Outlook Report;
2  Peer Stein, Oya Pinar Ardic and Martin Hommes, “Closing the Credit Gap for Formal and Informal 
Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises,”  World Bank, August 2016,
3  Barton, Dominic and Martin Wiseman (2013), “Investing for the Long Term,” McKinsey Global 
Institute; Rey, H., 2016, “International Channels of Transmission of Monetary Policy and the Mundellian 
Trilemma,” IMF Economic Review, 64(1), 6–35; Ocampo, Jose Antonio (2018), Reforming the 
International Monetary System, New York, Oxford University Press.
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Monetary Fund shows that public investment in the form of fiscal policy by national 
governments also tends to be be biased toward short-term electorial cycles.4
Development Finance Institutions such as national and sub-regional development 
banks and multi-lateral development banks have a unique roll to play.  These institutions 
can take a longer-run societal view toward financing, can uphold and demonstrate 
standards of excellence, and can mobilize commercial financing in tandem with their 
goals. However, many DFIs have been under capitalized and underperforming, and 
there is little coordination across all the DFI’s toward these common goals.
DFI’s across the world hold roughly $6 trillion in total assets, with G-20 members as 
shareholders of $4.3 trillion of that total. The largest amount of DFI capital is held 
in national development banks, which are $4.8 trillion of the total, and MDBs at $1.8 
trilllion.5 While significant, these assets are dwarfed by the size of the need and are 
not always aligned with broader development goals.
We face a great challenge to mobilize trillions more in capital to change the structure 
of the world economy to one that is more sustainable and socially inclusive.6 Thus far, 
in bridging the infrastructure gap, MDBs have been done a limited job at mobilizing 
private capital peaking to just over $200 billion in 2010, and down to just $93 billion 
in 2017.7  The Global Infractructure Facility, supported by the G-20 and the World 
Bank for public-private partnerships (PPPs), has attracted a mere $84 billion and 
committed just $37 million.8 Of the limited mobilization that has occurred it is not 
clear that such resource mobilization has been pro-poor and has enhanced debt 
sustainability, and broader development goals.9 DFIs will need to convene multi-
stakeholder forums to align the public and private sectors in this regard.
4  International Monetary Fund (2017), Fiscal Politics, Washington, IMF.
5  Gallagher, Kevin P. and William Kring (2017), Remapping Global Economic Governance, GDP Center 
Policy Brief 004, Global Development Policy Center, Boston University.
6   Bazzi, Samuel, Rikhil Bhavnani, Michael Clemens, and Steven Radelet. “Counting Chickens When They 
Hatch:  Timing and the Effects of Aid on Growth,”The Economic Journal, June 2012, 122: 590-617;Easterly, 
William (2001), The Elusive Quest for Growth:Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics 
Cambridge MA: MIT Press; Buntaine, Mark (2016), Giving Aid Effectively: The Politics of Environmental 
Performance and Selectivity at Multilateral Development Banks, Oxford University Press,
7  World Bank (2018), 2017 Private Participation in Infrastructure Annual Report, Washington, World Bank.
8 World Bank (2018), Global Infrastructure Facility, Washington, World Bank, http://fiftrustee.
worldbank.org/Pages/gif.aspx
9  Intependent Evaluation Group (2014) World Bank Group Support to Public-Private Partnerships, 
Washinton, World Bank.
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We call on G20 leaders to task development finance institutions (DFIs) such as the 
development banks in member countries and the Multi-lateral Development Banks 
(MDBs) of which G-20 countries are members, to commit: to scaling up resources 
by 25 percent, to calibrate new financing to international commitments to mitigate 
climate change and the 2030 agenda, and to work together as an inclusive system 
toward achieving those shared goals.
Scale Up Development Finance
DFIs, especially the MDBs, will need a stepwise expansion and optimization of capital 
to meet our common goals. This can be accomplished by increasing the base capital 
of DFIs, expanding their lending headroom, and by mobilizing capital from the 
commercial sector.  
DFIs will need to increase their base and callable capital and increase the lending 
headroom on their balance sheets to meet broader development goals. Since the global 
financial crisis some DFI’s have made significant increases to the amount of DFI capital 
in the world economy but a stepwise increase from these levels is still needed.10 Chief 
among those contributions has come from China. Since the crisis China has increased 
the assets of the China Development Bank by $1.5 trillion, with roughly one-fifth of 
its balance sheet now in overseas financing to sovereign governments outside China. 
What is more, China has helped establish two new MDBs in the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank and the New Development Bank.11 Many national and sub-regional 
development banks in emerging market and developing countries also replenished or 
created new DFIs as well as they accumulated reserves due to the commodity-boom 
in the aftermath of the crisis (Appendix 2). Recently, shareholders endorsed a $7.5 
billion paid-in capital increase for International Bank for Reconstruction (IBRD) and 
Development and $5.5 billion paid-in capital for International Finance Corporationas 
well as a $52.6 billion callable capital increase for IBRD.12 
In addition to further capital increases, some DFIs have significant ‘lending headroom’ 
10  Bhattacharya, Amar, et al, (2018), The New Global Agenda and the Future of the Multilateral 
Development Bank System, Washington, Brookings Institution.
11   Gallagher, Kevin P. and William Kring (2017), Remapping Global Economic Governance, GDP Center 
Policy Brief 004, Global Development Policy Center, Boston University.
12  World Bank (2018), Press Release:  World Bank Group Shareholders Endorse Transformative Capital 
Package, April 21, 2018. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/04/21/world-bank-
group-shareholders-endorse-transformative-capital-package
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to provide more financing while continuing to maintain strong credit ratings. A 
number of recent studies, including a study by Standard and Poor’s rating agency 
itself, estimate that MDBs could increase their lending headroom by $598 to $1.9 
trillion under various scenarios. Without a capital increase, if MDBs optimized their 
balance sheets at a AAA rating, the range of increase ranges from $598 billion to $1 
trillion.  With a capital increase of 25 percent by major MDBs, lending could expand 
by $1.2 to $1.7 trillion. If some MDBs were to optimize at a AA+ rating, expansion could 
reach close to $2 trillion dollars. In the later case however, optimizing at AA+ will have 
an negative impact on profitability though according to research to support this 
brief the net benefits are still likely to be positive.13 In addition to expanding lending 
headroom, some DFIs are considering securitizing their loan portfolios, though there 
are few examples of DFI securitization and estimates of the benefits and costs of 
such an approach not yet forthcoming14.
There is potential to further bridge financing gaps through blended finance and 
PPPs, and DFIs can play a key role in mobilizing the much needed public and private 
capital to finance sustainable infrastructure.15 Blended finance has been defined 
as “the strategic use of development finance and philanthropic funds to mobilize 
private capital flows to emerging and frontier markets” using such instruments as 
guarantees, securitization commercial bank loans, syndicated loans, credit lines, 
direct investments in companies, credit enhancement of project bonds, and shares 
in special purpose vehicles. 
Private participation in infrastructure projects has been promoted for many years 
through PPPs and are now foscusing on the design of financial instruments to develop 
infrastructure as an asset class.  Unfortunately, relative to the size of the gaps private 
finance of infrastructure is falling short. Blended finance has mobilized only $31 billion 
through blended financing efforts since 2000.16 As noted earlier, there is promise 
13  Humphrey, C. 2015. “Are Credit Rating Agencies Limiting the Operational Capacity of Multilateral 
Development Banks?” 30 October 2015. Paper Commissioned for the Inter-Governmental Group 
of 24. Washington DC: G24; Humphrey, C. (2018), “The Role of Credit Rating Agencies in Shaping 
Multilateral Finance, Paper Commissioned for the Inter-Governmental Group of 24. Washington DC: 
G24; Settimo, R. 2017. “Towards a More Efficient Use of Multilateral Development Banks’ Capital.” 
Occasional Paper Series 393, September 2017. Rome: Bank of Italy; S&P Global Ratings. 2017b. “Key 
Considerations for Supranationals’ Lending Capacity and Their Current Capital Endowments.” 18 May 
2017. New York: S&P Global Ratings; Munir, Waqas and Kevin P. Gallagher (2018), Scaling Up Lending 
at the Multilateral Development Banks, GEGI WORKING PAPER 013  Global Development Policy 
Center, Boston University USA.
14  Humphrey, Christopher (2018), Channeling Private Investment to Infrastructure: What Can MDBs 
Realistically Do? London: Overseas Development Institute, Working Paper 534
15  Humphrey, Christopher (2018), Channeling Private Investment to Infrastructure: What Can MDBs 
Realistically Do? London: Overseas Development Institute, Working Paper 534;
16  OECD (2018), Making Blended Finance Work for the Sustainable Development Goals, Paris, OECD; 
Humphrey, Christopher (2018), Channeling Private Investment to Infrastructure: What Can MDBs 
Realistically Do? London: Overseas Development Institute, Working Paper 534; Lee, Nancy (2018), 
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in PPPs, though should not be overblown. As noted earlier,private participation in 
infrastructure projects has also been relatively small. The majority of that financing 
has gone to developed and large middle-income countries. Only 24 of the poorest 
countries had a single infrastructure project with private participation between 2011 
and 2015.17 The Inter-Agency Task Force on Financing for Development found that of 
the close to $50 billion mobilized by MDBs in private co-financing, only US$1 billion 
flowing to least developed countries and little evidence that the most vulnerable in 
those countries were beneficiaries.18
Finance for Development
Echoing the G-20 Eminent Persons Group, DFI “governance structures and internal 
incentives should be reoriented towards achieving development impact, rather than 
deployment of their own financing.”19 Maximizing finance for development is not 
the same thing as optimizing development bank finance under a ‘business as usual’ 
scenario. Current infrastructure is responsible for the majority of carbon dioxide 
emissions and lays the foundation for much of the unsustainable production and 
consumption patterns and accentuates exisiting inequities in much of the global 
economy today.20 
Adapting to country and regional circumstances calibrating new finance to Agenda 
2030 and the Paris agreements should be the guiding rationale for new financing. 
What is more, DFIs will need to deploy new measurement and monitoring systems 
that ensure that DFI’s maximize the development impacts and mitigate the 
development and financial risks of their efforts for better development effectiveness. 
Key to measuring and monitoring progress is the need to increase transparency 
for measurement, evaluation, and accountability. Member states of the United 
Billions to Trillions? Issues on the Role of Development Banks in Mobilizing Private finance, Washington, 
Center for Global Development.
17  Humphrey, Christopher (2018), Channeling Private Investment to Infrastructure: What Can MDBs 
Realistically Do? London: Overseas Development Institute, Working Paper 534; Ruiz-Nuñez, F. and 
Z. Wei (2015) Infrastructure Investment Demands in Emerging Markets and Developing Economies.
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 7414. Washington DC: World Bank.
18  Inter-Agency Task force on Financing for Development (2018), Financing for Development Progress 
and Prospects 2018, New York, United Nations.
19  Eminent Persons Group, G-20 (2018), G20 Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on Global Financial 
Governance: Update for the G20 Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, https://
g20.org/sites/default/files/media/epg_chairs_update_for_the_g20_fmcbgs_meeting_in_buenos_
aires_march_2018.pdf
20  Davis, Steven, Steven J. Davis, Ken Caldeira, Damon Matthews, “Future CO2 Emissions and Climate 
Change from Existing Energy Infrastructure Science  10 Sep 2010:Vol. 329, Issue 5997, pp. 1330-1333; 
Bhattacharya, Amar, Jeremy Oppenheim, Nicholas Stern (2016), Driving Sustainable Development 
Through Better Infrastructure: Key Elements of a Transformation Program, Washington, Brookings 
Institution, New Climate Economy.
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Nations have agreed to collect a set of global indicators to be developed by the 
Inter-agency and Expert Group on Sustainable Development Goal Indicators (IAEG-
SDGs), indicators that can serve as a set of common agreed upon statistics that 
DFI financing can be calibrated toward and measured against.21 Adopting a clear 
and inclusive process to measure DFI progress for accountability will be critical to 
achieving Agenda 2030.
Some DFIs are leading on climate change commitments by pledging to provide 
disincentives for economic activity that accentuate climate change while simultaneously 
encouraging climate friendly activity. Many of the MDBs have strong limits on the 
financing of coal fired power plants, and the World Bank has pledged to end financing 
for upstream oil and gas extraction by 2019.22 The Inter-American Development Bank 
has pledged to all projects for relevant climate risks starting in 2018, and the Caribbean 
Development Bank has explored the adoption of ‘climate-stress testing’ of their entire 
balance sheet to protect it from climate-related stranded assets.23 Brazil’s national 
development bank and the Development Bank of Southern Africa  have created 
special climate funds. The China Development Bank has been active in green bond 
markets, issueing a $500 million bond certified by the Climate Bond Initiative for low 
carbon wind, transport and water projects in China and Pakistan. 
Strengthened and improved Environmental and Social Risk Management systems 
(ESRM) beyond those that examine climate change will be essential to ensuring that 
development financing is calibrated toward broader goals. While most development 
banks deploy ESRM, the quality and degree to which these systems are effective 
varies widely. Especially in the case of MDBs, ESRM has been perceived by host 
country finance ministries and by operations staff at MDBs as onerous conditionalities 
that slow project approval and completion without necessarily improving social and 
environmental outcomes.24 Other work has shown that some safeguards, such as 
environmental impact assessments, grievance mechanisms, and ‘free prior informed 
21  Inter-Agency Task force on Financing for Development (2018), Financing for Development Progress 
and Prospects 2018, New York, United Nations.
22  Piccio, Lorenzo (2016), To Coal or Not to Coal? A Balancing Act for MDBs, DevEx, https://www.
devex.com/news/coal-or-no-coal-a-balancing-act-for-mdbs-87610; World Bank (2017), World Bank 
Announcements at One Planet Summit, Washington, World Bank, http://www.worldbank.org/en/
news/press-release/2017/12/12/world-bank-group-announcements-at-one-planet-summit
23  Inter-American Development Bank (2017), Delivering a Climate Agenda for Latin America, 
Washington, Inter-American Developmetn Bank; Stefano Battiston, Antoine Mandel, Irene Monasterolo, 
Franziska Schütze, and Gabriele Visentin, “A Climate Stress Test for the Financial System,” Nature Climate 
Change volume 7, pages 283–288 (2017); Monasterolo, I., Battiston, S. (2016). Assessing portfolios’ 
exposure to climate risks: an application of the CLIMAFIN-tool to the Caribbean Development Bank’s 
projects portfolio. Final deliverable Technical Assistance for Climate Action Support to the Caribbean 
Development Bank TA2013036 R0 IF2.
24   Humphrey, Chris (2016), Time for a New Approach to Environment and Social Protection at Multilateral 
Developmetn Banks, London, Overseas Development Institute; World Bank. (2010). Safeguards and 
sustainability policies in a changing world. Independent Evaluation Group. Washington, DC:
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consent’ by local communities help DFIs identify and mitigate risk and improve 
project outcomes.   
Some DFIs, such as the Development Bank of Latin America, the KfW of Germany, 
the Caribbean Development Bank, and the have a unique approach whereby 
they provide grant and concessional financing as well as technical assistance to 
borrowing countries to establish effective ESRMs at the project level, enhancing 
the institutional capabilities of borrowing nations rather than imposing conditions 
without corresponding financing.25 DFIs will need to strengthen and improve ESRMs 
appropriate to country and regional circumstances and in calibration with broader 
development goals by promoting a multi-stakeholder dialogue in this regard..
A new set of principles and guidelines will need to be created to ensure that PPPs 
and blended finance approaches are calibrated to Agenda 2030 as well. A recent 
UN assessment evaluated the guidelines of 12 major institutions including the OECD, 
World Bank, IMF and others and found that the guidelines do not yet align with 
Agenda 2030.  Across the guidelines there is a lack of clear guidance regarding when 
PPPs are appropriate and when they are not, how to align with national process & 
international commitments, guidance on the Fair sharing of risk and rewards, alignment 
with sustainable development / SDGs; Climate, human rights considerations, and how 
to incorporate various Stakeholder perspectives.  
A next generation of PPPs should be driven to align with Agenda 203o and Paris.  For 
this to occur, the study concludes, “governments must consistently strive to realize 
broad public value and public good from PPPs. This means the public must be at 
the center of PPP deliberations, decision making and delivery. Governments must 
engage with citizens, weigh the socioeconomic costs and benefits of PPPs, and put 
in place appropriate institutional and accountability mechanisms, systems, processes, 
and capacity to achieve the fuller vision. As part of PPPs, commercial actors must 
also commit and be subject to adopting appropriate standards that aligning with 
broader goals26.” 
Global Cooperation and Governance
The G-20 should encourage the establishment of a multi-stakeholder forum that 
includes not soley national governments and MDBs, but also the broader set of 
DFIs, the business community, civil society, and other key stakeholders into a 
25  Yuan, Fei, and Kevin P. Gallagher (2017), “Standardizing Sustainable Development: A comparison of 
development banks in the Americas,” Journal of Environment & Development 2017, Vol. 26(3) 243–271
26  Aizawa, Motoko (2018), “A Scoping of PPP Guidelines,” DESA Working Paper 154, United Nations 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
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cooperative process. While there are a number of separate forums and platforms 
for DFI collaboration, there lacks a global forum for DFI dialogue, cooperation, 
coordination, and collaboration among relevant stakeholders.  The World Federation 
for Development Financing Institutions (WFDFI) and its regional chapters is the most 
systematic set of groupings among DFIs, especially for national development banks. 
The International Development Finance Club (IDFC) is the most comprehensive 
attempt to bring together both national development banks, subregional development 
banks, and some MDBs such as the Islamic Development Bank.  Of course, as part of 
the annual and spring meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
the larger Western-backed MDBs convene and at times coordinate.
From these efforts have been a number of initiatives that could be scaled and replicated 
across a broader global system. The IDFC negotiated a pledge to generate $100 billion 
in green financing and developed an aligned tracking and monitoring system and 
then negotiated a set of ‘Common Principles for Climate Mitigation Finance Tracking’ 
and now regularly report on progress.27 The Inter-American Development Bank, in 
part drawing on support from joint funds between China’s development banks and 
central bank and the IDB, has a program with members of Latin American Association 
of Development Financing Institutions (ALIDE), the Latin American regional grouping 
of the WFDFI to on-lend, credit enhance, and provide technical assistance to national 
development banks in the Americas for clean energy and energy efficiency, ESRM, 
and have created a ‘Green Finance in Latin America’ platform.28 Deploying a similar 
model, the New Development Bank of the BRICs countries raises funds on green 
bond markets and on-lends for sustainable infrastructure to national development 
banks in member countries.29 Germany’s KfW is working with the International 
Renewable Energy Association to establish a regional liquidity facility for renewable 
energy infrastructure, and the KfW and France’s AFD have had credit facilities with 
the Development Bank of Latin America for some time30.  
There are limitless opportunities and agendas for a global forum of coordination and 
cooperation across DFIs. Shared country strategies, the development of regional 
approaches (especially for infrastructure), dialogue on safeguards and standards, could 
27  IDFC (2015), “Common Principles on Climate Mitigation Financing,” Germany, IDFC, International 
Development Finance Corporation, https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/65d37952-434e-40c1-
a9df-c7bdd8ffcd39/MDB-IDFC+Common-principles-for-climate-mitigation-finance-tracking.
pdf?MOD=AJPERES
28  Inter-American Development Bank (2018), Green Finance for Latin America, Washington, IDB, 
https://www.greenfinancelac.org/projects-map/
29  New Development Bank (2017), NDB’s General Strategy, 2017-2012, Shanghai, New Development 
Bank, https://www.ndb.int/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/NDB-Strategy-Final.pdf
30  International Development Finance Club (2016), Moving from Triangular Cooperation to 
Cooperation for Development: New Initiatives for Deepening IDFC Collaboration, Germany, KfW, IDFC; 
Griffith-Jones, Stephanie (2016), National Development Banks and Sustainable Infrastructure, the case 
of the KfW, GEGI Working Paper 006, Global Development Policy Center, Boston University, USA.
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all be part of such an agenda.  Over time some of the best practices discussed above 
could be scaled up.  Proposals for such cooperation include a global special purpose 
vehicle and global guarantee funds for sustainable infrastructure, and the creation of 
project platforms to facilitate crowding-in private investment, among others.31
A global forum for DFIs could also help foster a more global representation of the 
stakeholders of the development process. Quoting from a recent report on the 
subject that success may depend on “A vision of a system serving all developing 
countries requires a governance structure that permits adequate voice.”32 given that 
research shows how “when borrowing countries have more voice have: less reliance 
on a compliance rules-based culture, and more cost-effective linkage between 
safeguards and development benefits; less conservative financial policies; more 
flexibility in allocation procedures; and less internal oversight and cost.”33 Aligning 
national development banks, borrower-led sub-regional DFIs, and the MDBs as well 
as with civil society participation would provide for a more cohesive and legitimate 
system to coordinate, and calibrate global DFI financing toward our common future.
31  Lee, Nancy (2018), More Mobilizing, Less Lending: A Pragmatic Proposal for MDBs, Washington, 
Center for Global Development; Studart, Rogerio, ad Kevin P. Gallagher (2018), Guaranteeing 
Sustainable Infrastructure, Journal of International Economics, (forthcoming).
32  Bhattacharya, Amar, et al, (2018), The New Global Agenda and the Future of the Multilateral 
Development Bank System, Washington, Brookings Institution.
33  Homi Kharas, “The Post-2015 Agenda and the Evolution of the World Bank Group,” The Brookings 
Institution, GED Working Paper 92, September 2015 
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Private Inverstment in the World Economy
(% of GDP)
34  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2017), Trade and Development Report, 
2017), Geneva, United Nations.
13
Appendix 235
35    Gallagher, Kevin P. and William Kring (2017), Remapping Global Economic Governance, GDP 
Center Policy Brief 004, Global Development Policy Center, Boston University.
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